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Suppose a one-place sentential connective  has the following two features:
1. It is closed under logical equivalence (CLE), i.e. if φ and ψ are logically equivalent
sentences, then from φ one can infer ψ;
2. It is closed under substitution of co-referential definite descriptions (CSCD), i.e. if φ
contains occurrences of a definite description ιxα which are not within the scope of
any non-extensional connective, and ψ is φ with one or more of these occurrences
replaced by the definite description ιxβ, then from ιxα = ιxβ and φ one can infer ψ.
Then, assuming Russell’s Theory of Definite Descriptions, given any two sentences φ
and ψ, from φ ≡ ψ and φ, one can infer ψ. That is to say,  is closed under material
equivalence, i.e.  is truth-functional. Call the proposition that any connective which is
both CLE and CSCD is truth-functional FLATTENING.
FLATTENING, if true, imposes serious constraints on various theories of great philo-
sophical interest, e.g. theories of modality, belief, and knowledge. This is quite obvious.
The operators ‘it is necessary that’, ‘it is possible that’, ‘Sam believes that’ and ‘Sam
knows that’ are certainly not truth-functional – at least one should recognise it if one
takes them seriously. Thus by FLATTENING, any serious theory of necessity in which the
notion is expressed by means of a sentential operator must give up Russell’s Theory of
Descriptions, or deny that the operator is CLE, or deny that it is CSCD – and the same
holds mutatis mutandis of belief and knowledge.
FLATTENING also imposes constraints on various other theories, like for instance the-
ories of facts, propositions, state of affairs or situations – though in these cases the con-
nection is not so straightforward. Consider facts. Suppose there are such entities, and
that some expressions of type ‘the fact that φ’ (where φ is a true sentence) are terms
which denote (facts). Let then φ be a true sentence such that ‘the fact that φ’ is denot-
ing, and let  be the “fact-operator” ‘the fact that φ = the fact that …’. Then φ is true.
Assuming that  is truth-functional, we must conclude that given any true sentence ψ
such that ‘the fact that ψ’ is denoting, ‘the fact that φ = the fact that ψ’ is true. That is
to say, we must conclude that all facts which can be denoted by prefixing ‘the fact that’
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to a true sentence are identical, that there is only one such fact; and making the further 
assumption that all facts can be denoted that way in some language, the conclusion is 
that there is only one fact. These are conclusions any regular friend of facts is likely to 
reject. And by FLATTENING, rejecting the conclusions means giving up Russell’s Theory 
of Descriptions, or denying that fact-operators are both CLE and CSCD.
FLATTENING is a consequence of a result I shall call CHURCH, which Neale extracts 
from a formal proof he takes to be an abstract version of “slingshot arguments” of a 
series which originates in Church’s (1943) objection to Carnap’s view that 
sentences denote propositions, and includes Davidson’s (1967, 1969) celebrated 
slingshots. The work is done in chapter 8, and in the following chapter Neale 
establishes another gen-eral result I shall call GÖDEL, on the basis of another formal 
proof he takes to be an abstract version of a slingshot suggested by Gödel (1944).
Each result states that a one-place connective is truth-functional provided it satisfies 
certain conditions, some of them involving definite descriptions. Yet, on Neale’s 
view, GÖDEL is superior to CHURCH insofar as the conditions which appear in 
GÖDEL are weaker than those which appear in CHURCH. Neale also takes it that the 
proof which delivers GÖDEL is superior to the one which delivers CHURCH, insofar as, 
in order to be correct, the latter, but not the former, has to be supplemented by 
substantial views about definite descriptions.
The main philosophical interest of these general results, as Neale rightly stresses, 
lies not so much in the fact that they may be used to undermine e.g. non-extensional dis-
course or talk of facts, but rather in the fact that they provide one with precise constraints 
any viable theory of facts or non-extensional connectives should satisfy.
Chapter 8 and 9 are the core of the book. In these chapters Neale gives the formal 
proofs and extracts CHURCH and GÖDEL. Chapters 6 and 7 introduce some formal pre-
requisites, the notions of scope and extensionality and the inference principles which 
will be involved in the following chapters. Both CHURCH and GÖDEL are extracted from 
proofs which make use of some assumptions about definite descriptions, which are 
indeed satisfied by Russell’s Theory. Chapter 10 deals with the question as to how 
rival theories of descriptions behave with respect to these assumptions, and what 
results can be established if these theories are countenanced. In chapter 11 the 
consequences of CHURCH and GÖDEL for theories of facts and theories of causation 
are carefully exam-ined. Chapters 2 to 5 are historical in character. Chapter 2 is 
devoted to Davidson. His semantic programme is examined, his slingshot argument 
against facts is exposed and its use against the correspondence theory of truth and 
the notion of representation is explained. Chapter 3 deals with the Fregean roots of 
slingshot arguments, and chapter 4 with Russell’s own views about facts and definite 
descriptions. Finally the discussion about Russell’s views on descriptions is expanded 
in the appendix.The book is rich in content, clearly written and precise, and its topic exciting. The 
next part of the review will be critical. 
*******
The central chapters 8 and 9 – in which Neale gives his abstract versions of Church’s 
(1943) slingshot and of Gödel’s (1944) slingshot, and extracts from these arguments the 
general results CHURCH and GÖDEL, respectively – contain some important mistakes and 
lacunae I shall try to repair or fill in here. (I shall follow Neale’s technical vocabulary 
and notational conventions without explanation.)
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CHURCH is the following proposition:
(CHURCH) If a one-place connective is both +PSLE and +ι-SUBS, then it is +PSME.
Neale holds that this result can be extracted from a formal proof he gives on page 173,
assuming Russell’s Theory of Descriptions. Unfortunately the proof is faulty under the
Russellian treatment of descriptions. Neale assumes that by Russell’s Theory, given any
sentence φ and any singular terms a and b, φ is logically equivalent to a = ιx((x=a • φ)
∨ (x=b • ∼φ)), but this is not the case. In fact some models with only one individual
make some sentences false, while given any sentence φ and any singular terms a and b,
all such models make the Russellian rendering of a = ιx((x=a • φ) ∨ (x=b • ∼φ)) true.
But a correct proof can be constructed. It is in two parts. The first is given by Neale
himself on page 170, and it establishes that if a one-place connective is both +PSLE and
+ι-SUBS, then it permits the substitution salva veritate of truths for truths (we are still
assuming Russell’s Theory of Descriptions). The second part establishes that if a one-
place connective is both +PSLE and +ι-SUBS, then it permits the substitution salva ver-
itate of falsehoods for falsehoods:
1 [1] ∼φ premiss
2 [2] ∼ψ premiss
3 [3] φ premiss
3 [4] ∼(a = ιx(x=a • ∼φ)) 3, +PSLE
1,2 [5] ιx(x=a • ∼φ) = ιx(x=a • ∼ψ) 1,2, def. of ‘ιx’
1,2,3 [6] ∼(a = ιx(x=a • ∼ψ)) 4,5, +ι-SUBS
1,2,3 [7] ψ 6, +PSLE
In both parts of the proof, Russell’s Theory of Descriptions justifies the moves to lines
[4], [5] and [7].
It is clear that less than Russell’s Theory of Descriptions is required for the proof to
be correct. Say that definite descriptions are nice iff the following two conditions are
satisfied:
(1) φ and a = ιx(x=a • φ) are logically equivalent;
(2) ιx(x=a • φ) = ιx(x=a • ψ) is a logical consequence of φ, ψ.
Our proof establishes CHURCH on the sole assumption that definite descriptions are nice.
The view that definite descriptions are nice is by no means a trivial one. Under Russell’s
Theory of Descriptions the view is correct, but as Neale stresses, under some alternative
theories it is not (see chapter 10). Thus the proof from which CHURCH has been extracted,
in order to be correct, must be supplemented with some substantial principles about def-
inite descriptions. Neale rightly makes the same point about his (faulty) proof.
Let me now turn to GÖDEL:
(GÖDEL) If a one-place connective is both +ι-CONV and +ι-SUBS, then it is 
+PSME.
Neale extracts GÖDEL from a four-part proof given on pages 183-186. He claims that his
proof for GÖDEL is superior to his proof for CHURCH because the latter, but not the for-
mer, involves some moves whose justification requires some substantial, semantical
assumptions about definite descriptions. And he also claims that GÖDEL is in a certain
sense more worrying than CHURCH. 
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I do not think Neale’s first claim is correct. In his proof for CHURCH (page 173), line
[4] is supposed to be justified by line [1] and the definition of ‘ιx’, so there is the back-
ground assumption that given the definition of ‘ιx’, line [4] is a logical consequence of
line [1]. There is also a background assumption underlying the moves from line [2] to
line [3] and from line [5] from line [6], to the effect that certain formulas containing the
ι-operator are logically equivalent to other formulas. The truth-value of these assump-
tions turns on which particular semantic view about definite descriptions is counte-
nanced, as Neale rightly points out. And of course, similar considerations apply to my
two part proof for CHURCH. Now I claim that Neale’s proof for GÖDEL is on a par with
both proofs for CHURCH in this respect. The proof for GÖDEL makes use of two rules of
inference which concern definite descriptions, ι-CONV and ι-SUBS, which are applied
to extensional contexts. There is thus a background assumption governing the proof,
namely that both rules apply to such contexts salva veritate. And the truth-value of such
this assumption also turns on which particular semantic view about definite descriptions
is countenanced.
Neale might reply that the background assumptions used in my proof for CHURCH
(let me put aside Neale’s faulty proof here) are substantial while those used in the proof
for GÖDEL are not, i.e. that any theory of descriptions, in order to be taken seriously,
must in any event make the latter assumptions true, while some such theories may be
acceptable and yet inconsistent with the former assumptions. (On page 180 Neale notices
that some views about descriptions do not licence ι-CONV, but he just boldly says: “any
adequate theory of descriptions, it seems to me, must be compatible with [the fact that
ι-CONV is valid in extensional contexts]”.) But this should be carefully argued for, and
in any event I am not sure Neale would be willing to defend that view. For consider the
rule ι-CONV*, which licences the replacement of a sentence φ in a context by the sen-
tence a = ιx(x=a • φ) and vice versa. The view that both ι-CONV* and ι-SUBS apply
to extensional contexts entails that definite descriptions are nice. Now ι-CONV* is very
similar to ι-CONV. Would Neale claim that there is a deep asymmetry between 
ι- CONV* and ι-CONV, in that the view that ι-CONV* applies to extensional contexts
is a substantial one, while the view that ι-CONV applies to such contexts is not?
I do not think Neale’s second claim is correct either. On page 201, he says that GÖDEL
is more worrying than CHURCH “on the obvious assumption that every “Gödelian equiv-
alence”, as given by ι-CONV, is also a logical equivalence, but not vice versa”. The idea
seems to be the following. Let C be the class of +PSLE, +ι-SUBS connectives, and let
G be the class of +ι-CONV, +ι-SUBS connectives. CHURCH states that every connective
in C is truth-functional, and GÖDEL that every connective in G is truth-functional. Neale
seems to think is that C is a proper part of G, and that it is for that reason that GÖDEL
is more worrying than CHURCH. We may agree that if C is a proper part of G, then GÖDEL
is indeed more worrying than CHURCH. But on the assumption that GÖDEL is true, C is
not a proper part of G. In fact if a connective is in G, then by GÖDEL it is +PSME, and so
it is +PSLE (two logically equivalent sentences are materially equivalent), and so it is in
C. That is to say, if GÖDEL is true, G is a (proper or improper) part of C. Now the assump-
tion Neale finds “obvious” entails that C is a (proper or improper) part of G. Thus as a
conclusion, if both GÖDEL and Neale’s assumption are true, then C = G, and GÖDEL and
CHURCH have the same worrying character.
CHURCH logically follows from the two-part proof given above and the assumption
that definite descriptions are nice. GÖDEL, on the other hand, does not logically follow
from Neale’s four-part proof and the assumption that i-CONV and i-SUBS apply to
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extensional contexts. One reason is that some parts of Neale’s proof (pages 185-186)
make use of the assumption that the connective is +DNN. So at best the proof estab-
lishes that, on the assumption that i-CONV and i-SUBS apply to extensional contexts,
if a one-place connective is +i-CONV, +i-SUBS and +DNN, then it is +PSME. Neale
cannot but agree with that point. Now the proof does not even establish that weaker
result. It establishes less, namely that:
(GÖDEL’) If a one-place connective is +ι-CONV, +ι-SUBS and +DNN, then it is 
+PSME with respect to subject-predicate sentences.
Neale is aware of that fact, but he claims, following a suggestion of Gödel’s (1944), that
a certain assumption yields the more general result – to wit the assumption that “any
sentence can be put into subject-predicate form” (see pages 130 and 186). It is not clear
what this means. I suggest, following a hint given by Neale (page 130), that the princi-
ple is that in any context whatsoever, any occurrence of a sentence φ can be replaced
salva veritate by the sentence |φ|(a) (read: ‘a is such that φ’) for any (referring) singular
term a. Call this Gödel’s principle. Using GÖDEL’ and Gödel’s principle, we can indeed
prove what we wanted, namely that:
(GÖDEL’’) If a one-place connective is +ι-CONV, +ι-SUBS and +DNN, then it is 
+PSME
on the assumption that ι-CONV and ι-SUBS apply to extensionalcontexts. The proof is
fairly simple:
1 [1] φ ≡ ψ premiss
2 [2] φ premiss
1 [3] |φ|(a) ≡ |ψ|(b) 1, Gödel’s principle
2 [4] |φ|(a) 2, Gödel’s principle
1,2 [5] |ψ|(b) 3,4, GÖDEL’
1,2 [6] ψ 5, Gödel’s principle
I do not know whether Neale would be prepared to accept my formulation of Gödel’s
suggestion. But whether or not he would, I think he would agree that GÖDEL cannot be
extracted from his formal proof, even with the help of the principle suggested by Gödel
(whatever its formulation), while GÖDEL’’ can. (Note that if GÖDEL’’ is true, then the
class G’’ of connectives satisfying the conditions in GÖDEL’’ is a (proper or improper)
part of the class C of connectives satisfying the conditions in Church, so that GÖDEL’’,
just like Gödel, is not “more worrying” than Church.)
Thus Neale’s abstract version of Gödel’s slingshot establishes that GÖDEL’ is true if
ι-CONV and ι-SUBS apply to extensional contexts, and from this result and Gödel’s
principle we get the conclusion that GÖDEL’’ is true if ι-CONV and ι-SUBS apply to
such contexts. Now I wish to show that if Gödel’s principle is accepted, then the very
same conclusion can be drawn directly from a fairly simple formal proof, a proof which
is actually simpler than Neale’s. The proof is the following:
1 [1] φ premiss
2 [2] ψ premiss
3 [3] ©φ premiss
1 [4] |φ|(a) 1, Gödel’s principle
2 [5] |ψ|(a) 2, Gödel’s principle
3 [6] ©|φ|(a) 3, Gödel’s principle
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1 [7] a = ιx(x=a • |φ|(x)) 4, ι-CONV
2 [8] a = ιx(x=a • |ψ|(x)) 5, ι-CONV
3 [9] ©(a = ιx(x=a • |φ|(x))) 6, ©+ι-CONV
1,3 [10] ©(a = a) 7,9, ©+ι-SUBS
1,2,3 [11] ©(a = ιx(x=a • |ψ|(x))) 8,10, ©+ι-SUBS
1,2,3 [12] ©|ψ|(a) 11, ©+ι-CONV
1,2,3 [13] ©ψ 12, Gödel’s principle
1 [1] ~φ premiss
2 [2] ~ψ premiss
3 [3] ©φ premiss
1 [4] ~|φ|(a) 1, Gödel’s principle
2 [5] ~|ψ|(a) 2, Gödel’s principle
3 [6] ©|φ|(a) 3, Gödel’s principle
3 [7] ©~~|φ|(a) 6, ©+DNN
1 [8] a = ιx(x=a • ~|φ|(x)) 4, ι-CONV
2 [9] a = ιx(x=a • ~|ψ|(x)) 5, ι-CONV
3 [10] ©~(a = ιx(x=a • ~|φ|(x))) 6, ©+ι-CONV
1,3 [11] ©~(a = a) 8,10, ©+ι-SUBS
1,2,3 [12] ©~(a = ιx(x=a • ~|ψ|(x))) 9,11, ©+ι-SUBS
1,2,3 [13] ©~~|ψ|(a) 12, ©+ι-CONV
1,2,3 [14] ©|ψ|(a) 13, ©+DNN
1,2,3 [15] ©ψ 14, Gödel’s principle
This proof actually deliver a stronger result, namely that GÖDEL’’ is true if ι-CONV alone
applies to extensional contexts. (It is also possible to modify Neale’s proof so as to estab-
lish that GÖDEL’ is true if ι-CONV alone applies to extensional contexts.)
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